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ABSTRACT:  We maximize OPEC's social welfare from their oil production including the 
domestic as well as the export market.  For welfare maximization OPEC countries should set 
domestic oil price equal to the marginal revenues from the oil export market and, therefore, 
domestic oil price should be lower than the world price.  Our base case price leader model 
yields a 1995 export price of $14.21/bbl (barrel) and 27,042 MBPD (thousands of barrels per 
day) of OPEC exports with a domestic price and quantity of $5.22/bbl and 5,175 MBPD for the 
base case.  However, with competition world oil price should fall dramatically to $6.40 per 
barrel with OPEC's world market share approaching 70%.   
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Oil exports account for about 15% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) with some countries shares even 
higher as seen in Table 1.1.  Therefore, any loss in welfare by not maximizing the benefits of oil 
is potentially significant. 
Table 1.1  OPEC Total Output and Domestic Market Consumption 












Indonesia 169,859  1,576  814.31 4,372.47  2.57  0.5168 
Algeria 91,428 1,348 227.62  6,431.52 7.03  0.1689 
Libya  30,924 1,430 171.69  7,223.31  23.36 0.1201 
Nigeria 51,665 1,998 284.04  9,838.96  19.04 0.1422 
Venezuela  75,328 2,916 448.47  14,164.82  18.80 0.1538 
Kuwait 29,411 2,156 140.42  11,570.40  39.34 0.0651 
Iraq --- 586  474.13  642.19  ----  0.8091 
Iran 249,917  3,715  1,140.18  14,780.71  5.91 0.3069 
Qatar 8,533 539 42.36  2,850.95  33.41  0.0785 
Saudi Arabia  126,968  8,948  1,168.11  44,660.33  35.17  0.1306 
UAE  43,059 2,442 315.86  12,205.07  28.34 0.1293 
Total / 
Average 
877,092 27,654 5,227.17  128,740.86  14.68  0.1890 
Note: The percentage of total revenues was calculated relative to GDP. Total revenues were 
estimated from quantity of exports times the 1995 weighted average price of oil for OPEC (EIA 
1995, 1997a) 
Numerous authors have modeled OPEC's oil market.  However, all have focused on 
OPEC's export market, ignoring OPEC's domestic market.  Yet, the domestic market is 
considerable accounting for almost 20% of OPEC's oil as seen in Table 1.1.  For Indonesia the  
 
3 
domestic market is close to one-half of its total oil output, while for Gulf countries the ratio is 
much lower.  So the decision of how to maximize the benefits, including domestic oil 
consumption, is relevant not only for OPEC but is even more so for some individual countries.  
Further, domestic markets will tend to gain in the relative share of OPEC total production. 
Our contribution is to model OPEC’s social welfare from oil including both the domestic 
and the export market.  We do not aim to explain how OPEC actually behaves, or why.  Rather 
our analysis provides normative guidance on what OPEC should do to maximize the benefits or 
social welfare from the exploitation of its oil resources.  Modeling benefits as social welfare is 
consistent with government ownership of a resource.   
In our analysis, we begin in section 2 with a simple price leader static model of OPEC in 
which we assume one product, oil, which is sold to the world and to the domestic market.  We 
define social welfare as the sum of consumer surplus in the domestic market and producer 
surplus in the domestic plus export markets.  We present the results of the price leader model in 
Section 3.  The modeling includes sensitivity analysis around the supply of the fringe, which will 
be varied to provide information on the impact of additional oil productive capacity outside the 
organization on the output decisions of OPEC.   
OPEC has at times displayed a lack of cohesion among its members.  Therefore, we also 
develop a competitive approach for comparison purposes in Section 4 to show OPEC's optimal 
price and quantity trajectories were OPEC to break up as a cartel.  Conclusions and suggestions 
for further work are contained in Section 5. 
2.  MODELING OPEC'S SOCIAL WELFARE  
  Numerous authors have modeled OPEC since the Arab oil embargo of 1973.  A few have 
argued that OPEC has behaved in a competitive fashion.  More have argued that OPEC is a  
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dominant firm, which either optimizes export profits statically or dynamically.  All have focused 
on OPEC's export market and none have specifically included the domestic market in the 
optimization social welfare.  (For a review of these articles, see Celta (1998).)   
Social welfare in OPEC's oil market consists of consumer welfare CW in the domestic oil 
market plus profits from both the domestic π dom and export market π x or 
x dom CW SW π π + + =           (2.1) 
Which can be rewritten as  
Max   ∫ + − + =
dom Q
x dom x x x dom d Q Q TC Q Q P dQ Q P SW
0
) ( ) ( ) (      (2.2) 
Where  = ) ( dom d Q P    Inverse domestic demand function for OPEC 
        P x(Qx) =   Residual export demand function for OPEC 
  = SW    OPEC’s social welfare 
TC =    Total production costs 
Note that, for the export market, the welfare expression does not include the area under 
the demand curve and above price, corresponding to consumer surplus, because consumer 
surplus goes to exporters and is not part of OPEC’s welfare.   
To maximize total welfare, we partially differentiate (2.2) with respect to domestic and 
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By combining equations (2.3 & 2.4), the welfare maximizing necessary condition in the 
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= + =         (2.5) 
This condition says that OPEC should set the domestic oil price equal to the additional 
revenues per barrel earned on the international market and both should be set equal to marginal 
cost Pd(Qdom) = MRx = MC.  The second order conditions for a maximum require that d
2SW is < 
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Multiplying through and rearranging we get 
2 2





























































   (2.13) 
Which can be simplified to 
0









































       (2.14) 
The first term in equation (2.14) is a product of two negative numbers, which makes a 
positive number.  The second term is the negative of the sum of two negative numbers times a 
positive number that makes a positive number and the second order sufficient conditions hold for 
a maximum. 
To implement (2.5) and solve for the optimal domestic oil consumption and exports we 
need to develop OPEC’s export demand function, domestic demand and OPEC's cost function.  
For the export demand we assume that OPEC is a dominant firm as shown in Figure 2.1.  
OPEC's residual demand function (Qx(Px,)) is the difference between the rest of world demand 
excluding OPEC Qrow(Px,)) and the supply of the fringe (Qf(Px)) or  













Figure 2.1 OPEC Export Market 
 
We model the supply of the fringe and demand for the rest of the world as multiplicative 
functional forms, which are normalized around the elasticity of demand and supply at the price 
and quantity of the market for 1995 (EIA 1997a).   
row
x x row row AP P Q Q
ε = = ) , (          (2.16) 
Where  = row ε  demand elasticity of the rest of the world. 
The supply of the fringe is  
f BP Q f
ε = ,           (2.17) 
Where  = f ε  price elasticity of supply of the fringe. 
The demand faced by OPEC can be restated as: 
f row
x x x BP AP Q
ε ε − =           (2.18) 
The rest of world demand was developed from the elasticity of demand for oil-importing 
countries from Dahl (1993), world consumption excluding OPEC countries (64,533 MBPD), and 
the 1995 market price of $15.73/bbl (EIA 1996).  The 1995 price was calculated as a weighted 
average of each exporting country’s crude price with weights being the corresponding relative 
production level for 1995 (EIA 1996).  The resulting demand for the non-OPEC countries is  
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406 . 0 4 . 197539
− = P Qrow         (2.19) 
For the competitive fringe, the marginal cost function estimated using elasticity values 
from Greene, Jones, and Leiby (1995) of ε q,p = 0.384 normalized around price and quantity for 
1995 (EIA 1996) is 
384 . 0 0 . 14512 P Q f =           (2.20) 
Combining (2.18 to 2.20) export demand faced by OPEC is  
384 . 0 406 . 0 0 . 14512 4 . 197539 P P Qx − =
−         (2.21) 
Given OPEC’s residual demand, total revenue from export demand is 
) (P PQ TR x x =          (2.22) 



















=      (2.23) 
We develop the numerator and denominator of this last expression from (2.18) as 




x ε ε ε ε
∂
∂
) 1 ( ) 1 ( + − + =        (2.24) 
1 1 − − − =




x ε ε ε ε
∂
∂
        (2.25) 
Combining (2.23 – 2.25), we get the expression for marginal revenues from OPEC’s export 
market: 
1 1















       (2.26) 
Substituting in input values gives  
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616 . 0 406 . 1
384 . 0 406 . 0
6 . 5572 * 0 . 80201








MRx        (2.27) 
The domestic-market demand equation was derived using the long-run elasticity of 
demand for oil-exporting countries (Dahl 1993) normalized around the consumption of OPEC 
countries 5244 MBPD and a domestic price of $4/bbl.  Yielding  
05 . 0 4 . 5620
− = P Qdom           (2.28) 
Inverting (2.28) 
20 74 ) ( 10 * 893 . 9 ) (
− = dom dom Q Q P         (2.29) 
In Table 2.1, we present a summary of the demand inputs to our model.   
Table 2.1 Demand Model Inputs Summary 
Model  Input     
World Demand Elasticity  -0.406 
Fringe Supply Elasticity    0.384   
Domestic Demand Elasticity  -0.050 
OPEC's costs, which are not publicly available, are the most problematic inputs.  Costs 
should be a function of both output (Q) and remaining reserves (R).  To develop such a function 
we use a variant of the work in Dahl (1991) taking cost information for operating and developing 
costs from EIA (1997b), adjusting it for a normal rate or return, and regressing it on proven 
reserves and production levels for 1995 from the Oil and Gas Journal (1994,1995).  In the case of 
OPEC’s operating costs (EIA 1997b), the rate of return adjustment was applied by multiplying 
by (1+r) assuming r to be 10%.  Costs of exploration and development (EIA 1997b) were 
translated to above-ground costs multiplied by ((α + r)/α ), to get total costs of above-ground oil 
from undeveloped reserves (Adelman & Shahi 1989).  In the equation α  represents the decline  
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rate, assumed to be 10% and r represents the rate of return.  All costs were translated to 1995 
constant dollars using the consumer price index from the Survey of Current Business (1996). 
We match up appropriate costs with actual and potential production and with remaining 
reserves.  We assume current production out of developed reserves will deplete in 10 years and 
only include operating costs because development costs are sunk.  For potential production, 
which must come from newly developed reserves, we include both development and operating 
costs.  In order to determine potential production from undeveloped reserves, we assume a 10% 
depletion rate for newly developed reserves.  The cost, production, and remaining reserves 
information is developed for each OPEC country.  Costs are then ordered from lowest to highest 
and are regressed on production and total remaining reserve values.   
In our regression we tried various specifications including log and log linear and found 
the following log linear marginal cost function to statistically dominate all others (t-scores are 
shown in parenthesis). 
) ( 3356 . 2     ) ( 3026 . 0      3263 . 46 ) (
) (   ) (     ) ( 2 1
opec opec
opec opec o
R Log Q Log MC Log
R Log Q Log MC Log
− + =
+ + = β β β
     (2.30) 
     (0.0098)  (46.4830)               (-1.814) 
The above equation for OPEC’s marginal cost shows signs on the estimated coefficients 
that are consistent with economic theory.  The positive sign on OPEC’s production coefficient 
shows that an increase of 1% in the quantity of oil would increase OPEC’s cost by 0.30%.  The 
function has the desirable property that the variable (R) captures the effect of depleting reserves 
on OPEC’s marginal costs (stock effect) showing that as OPEC depletes the resource, cost 
should increase.  This cost function, which has been developed in an indirect way, can be 




3.  Model Results for the Price Leader Model 
  Our completed model includes the optimality condition (2.5), demand for the rest of the 
world (2.19), supply of the fringe (2.20), OPEC's export demand and its corresponding marginal 
revenue function (2.21) and (2.27), OPEC’s domestic demand (2.29) and OPEC’s marginal cost 
(2.30) evaluated at estimated reserves of 778,000,000 MBPD (Oil and Gas Journal (1994)).  To 
generate the model results, we implemented and solved the system of equations in EXCEL and 
show the solution for the export and domestic market in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Static Analysis Price Leader Model Results 
Input / Output    Supply Sensitivity Cases 
  1995 Values  Low (0.114)  Base (0.384)  High (0.654) 
Price  (1995  $/bbl)  15.73 16.43 14.21 13.38 
Quantity of the fringe  41,809  42,017  40,209  37,611 
OPEC Domestic Price    4.92  5.22  5.41 
OPEC  Domestic  supply 5,263 5,190 5,175 5,165 
OPEC  Supply  ROW  22,724 21,385 27,042 31,304 
OPEC  Total  Production  27,987 26,575 32,217 36,469 
ROW  World  Consumption  64,533 63,402 67,251 68,915 
Total  World  Consumption  69,796 68,592 72,426 74,080 
OPEC Market Share %  35.21  38.74  44.48  49.23 
     Note: All quantities and prices are expressed in MBPD and 1995 dollars/bbl correspondingly. 
 
For the base case, OPEC should export 27,042 MBPD at $14.21/bbl, which is below the 
average price for 1995.  OPEC's share of the crude oil market should have been over 44% rather 
than the actual share, which is close to 35%. share.  For the domestic market, on the other hand, 
OPEC should have sold a total of 5,175 MBPD at a price of $5.22/bbl instead of 5,263 MBPD.   
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Thus, according to our static model, OPEC was over pricing in the export market and under 
pricing in the domestic market relative to a static optimum. 
There is a high degree of uncertainty around our model inputs leading us to conduct 
sensitivity analysis around supply elasticity of the fringe as presented in Table 3.1.
2  The low 
supply elasticity case (0.114) might represent a pessimistic view of the fringe supply resulting 
from the current Russian crisis.  The high elasticity case (0.654) might alternatively reflect more 
optimism in foreign investment in fringe areas and continually improving technology. 
The model suggests that with more development of new fringe reserves and a higher 
elasticity of supply, OPEC will sell higher quantities at lower prices.  Although not directly 
addressed, cheating between the members of the cartel can be thought of as output outside of 
OPEC.  Such cheating, as well as other additional fringe capacity, can be represented in the high 
elasticity case.  Alternatively, lack of foreign investment or political instability in fringe 
countries that impacts negatively their oil productive capacity is reflected in our low elasticity 
case. 
As the supply of the fringe becomes more elastic, OPEC's export residual demand 
becomes more elastic and the model recommends that OPEC should sell more exports at a lower 
price.  The lower price increases world consumption but decreases fringe production, thus 
increasing OPEC's share of the market.  The increase in OPEC's production raises marginal costs 
driving up domestic price and lowering domestic sales.   
                                                 
2The change in supply elasticity was selected to be one standard deviation above and one standard deviation below 
the original point estimate.  
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Other sensitivity tests showed changes in line with expectations.  High demand 
elasticities were associated with lower price and lower elasticities were associated with higher 
prices.  Shifts in supply of 10% either way, rather than a change in supply elasticity, changed oil 
prices somewhat over a dollar in the expected directions.  Raising and lowering marginal costs 
by $1 raised and lowered optimal export prices by around $0.70. 
4.  Model Results for a Competitive Model 
Throughout OPEC's 39-year history, its market power has had its ebbs and flows.  At 
times market power and cohesion have been strong.  At other times lack of cohesion has moved 
OPEC closer to competitive behavior as was true in 1998 and early 1999 when the Asian crisis 
weakened oil demand and cheating on quotas was prevalent.  We represent such a lack of quota 
discipline within OPEC with a competitive model.  By comparing the competitive to the price 
leader model such a model also demonstrates to OPEC the welfare costs of their lack of 
cohesion.   
The competitive solution provides a measure of OPEC’s market power and its 
effectiveness as a cartel.  It requires the horizontal summation of the supply curves (marginal 
cost curves) for OPEC and the fringe.  By setting the world supply equal to world demand, 
including OPEC countries, we find the competitive price.  Mathematically, this is shown below. 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( P Q P Q P Q P Q OPEC f dom row + = +        (4.1) 
Substituting in equations (2.19, 2.20, 2.28 and 2.30) into equation (4.1) we get  
[]
3026 . 0 / 1 3356 . 2 3263 . 46 384 . 0 05 . 0 406 . 0 ) 770000000 ( 0 . 14512 4 . 5620 4 . 197539 P e P P P
− − − − + = +    (4.2) 
Solving for price in equation (4.2) yields the competitive price, the competitive price for 
the oil market can be found as well as the quantity demanded by the market.  The quantity  
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produced by OPEC and the competitive fringe are found at the point where price equals marginal 
cost consistent with price taking behavior. 
The competitive results along with the price leader results are presented for our model 
outputs in Table 4.1.  The competitive model shows a price of $6.53/bbl and OPEC’s domestic 
and export quantities of 5,117 and 62,392 MBPD corresponding to a total market share of 
64.1%.  Relative to the 1995 actual values, OPEC exports are higher and domestic supply is 
lower.  OPEC’s export price is lower when OPEC is a price taker, but domestic price is higher 
because now domestic price is world price rather than the lower marginal revenue as dictated by 
our price leader model. 
Table 4.1 Competitive Static Model Solution 
Input / Output  1995 Values  Competitive  Price Leader  
Price (1995 $/bbl)  15.73  6.53  14.21 
Quantity of the fringe  41,809  29,828  40,209 
OPEC Domestic Price    6.53  5.22 
OPEC Domestic supply  5,263  5,117  5,175 
OPEC Supply ROW  22,724  62,392  27,042 
OPEC Total Production  27,987  67,509  32,217 
ROW World Demand  64,533  92,220  67,251 
Total World Demand  69,796  97,337  72,426 
OPEC Market Share  35.21  64.10  44.48 
      
 
Note the competitive price predicted by the static model is well below the market price 
for 1995 and the level of price for an optimum social welfare.  Accordingly, OPEC’s share of the 
market would increase up to 64% for the base case.  Total world demand would increase by over 
27 MMBPD from the actual levels for 1995, driving the fringe below 40% of market share.  The  
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results shown in Table 4.1 are consistent with OPEC as the low cost producer of the market.  
Another interesting result is shown by the increase in world consumption from 69,796 up to 
98,730 for the base case.  Sensitivity testing of the supply elasticity in the competitive model 
resulted in much smaller changes than in the price leader model.  For example increasing and 
decreasing supply elasticity, demand elasticity or shifting supply by 10% resulted in price of less 
than $0.20 per barrel. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We have maximized OPEC's social welfare including both the export and domestic 
markets, where social welfare equals the sum of consumer surplus in the domestic market plus 
profits from the export and domestic markets.  Given the debate over the extent of OPEC's 
market power, we have modeled OPEC as both a competitor and a price leader. 
We use multiplicative functional forms for the supply of the fringe, rest of the world 
demand, residual demand faced by OPEC and OPEC marginal costs and all model functions are 
constructed from the best actual inputs available to us.   
The welfare maximizing condition for OPEC as a price leader is to set the domestic price 
equal to both the marginal revenues from the export market and marginal production costs.  The 
welfare maximizing total quantity for OPEC in the base case is 32,217 MBPD, which includes 
both exports and domestic market consumption.  OPEC oil exports to the rest of the world 
should be 27,042 MBPD, corresponding to a price level of $14.21/bbl.  This level of exports 
suggests that if OPEC were to maximize static social welfare it should have increased exports by 
over 4,000 MBPD relative to 1995 level.  Sensitivity tests suggest that OPEC exports should 
increase and price should decrease as the elasticity of supply of the fringe increases, the demand  
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elasticity of the rest of the world increases, the supply of the fringe shifts out, or OPEC marginal 
costs fall.  All these sensitivity tests are consistent with economic theory.  
Domestic market results suggest that domestic prices should be set to $5.22/bbl for the 
base case.  This price would result in a domestic consumption reduction close to 100 MBPD 
from the 1995 level of consumption indicating that OPEC is pricing somewhat to low in its 
domestic market to statically optimize welfare.   
The above model assumes that OPEC is a price leader.  For comparison we also did a 
static competitive model, which illustrates the extent of OPEC's possible influence on price.  The 
competitive equilibrium price as predicted by the model is $6.53/bbl in 1995 dollars.  OPEC's 
output level is 67,509 MBPD of exports to the rest of the world and 5,117 MBPD to the domestic 
market.  Total world consumption would be 97,337 MBPD and OPEC’s market share would be 
64.1% of total world demand.   
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first analysis that explicitly maximizes OPEC 
social welfare including the domestic market.  However, this initial work could be extended in 
numerous directions including improving model inputs, making the model dynamic, and 
disaggregating across countries or products.  As with all simulation models, the model results are 
only as good as the assumptions and inputs into the model.  Since there is a high degree of 
uncertainty for the model inputs, particularly on the cost side, further work on the model could 
include more sensitivity testing on the parameters of the model.  Better inputs, when available, 
could quite easily be incorporated into the existing framework.   
Although our cost function includes production and depletion effects, technology effects 
may be an important factor that could extend our model.  Technology effects would push costs in 
the opposite direction than depletion effects. Therefore, given the limited information on OPEC  
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production costs, further research beyond the scope of this document may be required to extend 
our model to consider technology effects on OPEC’s cost function.  Since oil is a non renewable 
resource a dynamic model would chose a production profile over time that would optimize 
discounted welfare from total reserves rather than looking at oil production for one point in time.   
In order to determine the effect of pricing policies on individual social welfare, each 
country would need to be modeled within OPEC.  Although aggregate production numbers 
suggest that domestic social welfare may be a relatively small part of total welfare, it may be 
case that domestic social welfare is quite important for certain countries.  Therefore another 
possible extension to our aggregate analysis on OPEC could be a more disaggregate model of 
OPEC by country.   
The above models abstract from the fact that domestic welfare comes not from crude but 
rather from the derived demand for crude for product consumption.  In order to provide better 
guidance for domestic product pricing, our model could also be extended to derive the demand 
for crude oil from the individual demand for products.  
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